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JACK WEINSTEIN AND THE
MISSING PIECES OF THE HEARSAY PUZZLE
Richard D. Friedman*
INTRODUCTION
For the first three quarters of the twentieth century, the Wigmore
treatise1 was the dominant force in organizing, setting out, and ex-
plaining the American law of evidence.  Since then, the first two of
those roles have been taken over in large part by the Federal Rules of
Evidence (Rules).  And the third has been performed most notably by
the Weinstein treatise.2  Judge Jack Weinstein was present at the crea-
tion of the Rules and before.  Though he first made his name in Civil
Procedure, while still a young man he joined two of the stalwarts of
evidence law, Edmund Morgan and John Maguire, to become the jun-
ior—that is, the laboring—author on the oldest textbook in the field.3
He was a natural selection to be a member of the Advisory Commit-
tee that drafted the Rules.  The Rules were finally enacted in 1975,4
and though handling a full docket on the bench and teaching a full
load at Columbia Law School, he was ready: He published his monu-
mental treatise with Margaret Berger the same year.5
In this Article, I will take another look, more than half a century
later, at Judge Weinstein’s most important early contribution to the
law of hearsay.  In an article published in 1961, Probative Force of
Hearsay, he argued for a more discretionary approach to hearsay,
functionally oriented and procedurally sensitive.6  In early drafts, the
* Richard D. Friedman is the Alene and Allen F. Smith Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School.  Much of his writing has been on the relationship between hearsay law
and the confrontation right, and he has advocated a testimonial theory of the Confrontation
Clause since long before the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.
1. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1904).
2. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE (1975).
3. EDMUND M. MORGAN, JOHN M. MAGUIRE & JACK B. WEINSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1957).
4. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.
1926 (1975).
5. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2.
6. Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 338–42 (1961).
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Advisory Committee appeared willing to give the trial judge broad
discretion over the admissibility of hearsay, much as Judge Weinstein
had advocated.  But public commentary and congressional resistance
resulted in rules that took a more cautious approach: a definition of
hearsay followed by a list of exemptions.7  It was a long list, to be sure,
and one that included a matched pair of open-ended residual excep-
tions.  But this approach maintained the essential structure of tradi-
tional hearsay law and ensured that much of the work in applying that
law would consist of determining the bounds of the enumerated
exemptions.
I suggest in this Article that the principal factor that prevented the
Rules from granting more judicial discretion over hearsay was implicit
recognition that the admission of some hearsay violates fundamental
norms of our adjudicative system, irrespective of whether the evi-
dence appears reliable to a court.  And, I argue, the principal norm
that should render some hearsay inadmissible is the one articulated,
nearly three decades after enactment of the Rules, in Crawford v.
Washington8:  Witnesses in our system are expected to testify face-to-
face with the adverse party, under oath and subject to cross-examina-
tion and, if reasonably possible, at trial.9  That, we now better under-
stand, is a constitutional command with respect to prosecution
witnesses, and some constraint on hearsay is necessary to enforce it.
If a person gives testimony in another way—say, by talking to a police
officer in the station house or in her living room—that testimony can-
not be relayed to court, either by another witness testifying to what
she said, or by a writing or other form of recording presented at trial.10
And though this principle does not have as great constitutional force
when the evidence is not offered against an accused, it still is at least,
for better or worse, the expected practice of our system.11  We do not
expect witnesses to provide trial testimony by, say, filling out an affi-
davit, recording a video presentation, or asking a friend to repeat a
statement in court.  But, I will argue, if we protect this principle, at
least in criminal cases, then we really do not need anything resembling
the current law of hearsay.  I will suggest possibilities as to how the
principle might be applied, albeit with less rigor, with respect to evi-
dence offered by an accused or in a civil case.  In any event, if we
7. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No. 93-595, Rules 801,
803, 804, 88 Stat. 1926, 1938–43 (1975).
8. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
9. Id. at 68–69; see also FED. R. EVID. 603.
10. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
11. And it still has considerable force in such other contexts. See discussion infra note Part
VI.
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protect the principle adequately, we can adopt a discretionary ap-
proach—indeed, even one more open-textured than the one for which
Judge Weinstein advocated.  We can even do without the presumptive
exclusion of hearsay, folding the hearsay concern into the trial judge’s
overall discretionary power over evidence.  I will also suggest that in-
troducing a simple procedural feature will facilitate the change.
I. THE PROBATIVE FORCE OF HEARSAY
Let’s look at the celebrated article, Probative Force of Hearsay,12
that Professor Weinstein, as he then was, published in 1961.  I will
begin by noting a limitation of scope that he makes only in a footnote
at the very end of the article.  He does not address “[t]he extent to
which hearsay is forbidden by constitutional rules on confrontation.”13
Focusing on civil cases, he argues for turning the hearsay rule “from a
rule of exclusion,” marked by an “excessively detailed” list of excep-
tions, to a discretionary rule “hedged with protections designed to bal-
ance more adequately the need for hearsay and its possible abuse.”14
His first step is to analyze three factors cutting against free admissi-
bility of hearsay—the loss, respectively, of (1) the trier’s ability to ob-
serve the declarant’s demeanor; (2) trial convenience; and (3) the
benefits of cross-examination.15  He accords weight to these, so that
free admissibility of hearsay is not optimal; indeed, he recognizes that
hearsay dangers may be present in out-of-court conduct that reflects
the actor’s belief in a material proposition but does not assert it.16  But
neither do these factors “require the absolute exclusionary hearsay
rule,” which would be a serious impediment to the search for truth,
for each may be considered by the court in determining whether to
admit the evidence and by the trier of fact in determining how much
probative force to accord it.17  Rather, he suggests, they support only a
rule of preference, for there is no reason to suppose that the trier of
fact will not discount hearsay, and if the trier of fact is a jury, the court
can encourage such discounting by commenting on the evidence.18
While Judge Weinstein rejects the poles of free admissibility of
hearsay and absolute exclusion, he does not find much more appealing
the prevailing approach, associated with Professor Wigmore, of a long
12. Weinstein, supra note 6.
13. Id. at 355 n.159.
14. Id. at 355.
15. Id. at 334–36.
16. Id. at 331, 334.
17. Id. at 334.
18. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 335–36.
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enumeration of class exceptions.  The doctrine, he points out (though
he claims no originality for the point),19 does a poor job of mapping—
that is, of sorting out hearsay that is worthwhile from that which is
not.
Ultimately, then, he favors a system in which the trial court’s discre-
tionary control over hearsay is paramount, and in which procedural
protections play a prominent role.  In this system, when notice is prac-
tical, it should be required or at least encouraged, so that the court
might make an advance ruling and the opponent can better secure
rebuttal evidence; the trial court should exercise its power to comment
on the evidence and also, in appropriate cases, to keep a case away
from the jury; and appellate courts should be more aggressive about
controlling trial-level findings that are based on hearsay.  Judge Wein-
stein recognizes that most hearsay would likely be admitted under
such an approach, but that is not a bad thing.  Already, the rule
against hearsay is “a small and lonely island” in a “sea of admitted
hearsay,” and civil adjudications in which hearsay has played a promi-
nent role do not seem to have suffered.20
Thus, there were four cornerstones to Judge Weinstein’s approach
to hearsay as indicated in Probative Force of Hearsay:  First, and per-
haps most fundamentally, he believed that trial judges should have
greater discretion in determining the admissibility of hearsay than
they previously had.21  It is, I suppose, utterly unsurprising that Jack
Weinstein advocated greater discretion for the trial judge—but bear in
mind that he wrote this article more than five years before he took the
bench and became a judge who relished the opportunity to exercise
discretion.  Second, he believed that on the whole, the law should be
more receptive to hearsay than it previously had been.22  Third, he
believed that procedural considerations, including notice, should play
a significant role in hearsay law.23  And finally, he recognized that be-
cause of the confrontation right, some hearsay may be inadmissible
against a criminal defendant even though it would be admissible in a
civil case.24  Though this point was not at the center of Probative Force
of Hearsay, it was the essence of the very first comment he made
19. Id. at 339, 344.
20. Id. at 346–47.
21. Id. at 338–39, 353.
22. Id. at 338, 353, 354.
23. Id. at 340–42.
24. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 340 n.51, 355 n.159.
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when the Advisory Committee took up the Reporter’s first draft of
the rule against hearsay.25
II. THE FEDERAL RULES: AMBIVALENCE ABOUT DISCRETION
The Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Evidence (Reporter),
Professor Edward W. Cleary, circulated two drafts of each rule to the
Advisory Committee, and then in March 1969, the Committee pub-
lished for comment a Preliminary Draft of the whole set.  If one were
to look just at these initial drafts, one would conclude that Judge
Weinstein’s approach held considerable sway, at least with respect to
the elements of judicial discretion and overall receptivity to hearsay.
In these drafts, Rules 8-01 and 8-02, like their modern counterparts,
established, respectively, the definition of hearsay—a narrower one
than under the prior conception26—and its presumptive exclusion.
But Rules 8-03 and 8-04 did not state lists of exceptions as such; in-
stead, they stated general standards for overcoming the presumptive
exclusion of hearsay, and then provided nonexhaustive lists of illustra-
tions of statements that fit those standards, drawing on traditional ex-
ceptions but tending to state them expansively.  Interestingly, it
appears that the Advisory Committee adopted this basic approach
with no opposition and with little or no angst.  But as the Committee
deliberated, it tightened up somewhat on the standard governing ad-
missibility of a hearsay statement by an unavailable declarant; it is
perhaps ironic, or perhaps an indication that the first draft was rather
daring, that the suggestions for greater stringency were made by Judge
Weinstein.27
25. Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence 33 (Oct. 9–11, 1967), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV10-1967-min.pdf.  As the
Committee began its deliberations over the hearsay rule, Albert Jenner, the chairman, asked
“the professors” for their opinion. Id.  Judge Weinstein—still, and always, a professor, though
by then a judge—offered the first comment. Id.  The minutes record: “Judge Weinstein felt that
there should be more flexibility in the civil cases than in the criminal ones, and he thought that
the reporter’s approach to the problem was admirable.” Id.
26. Judge Weinstein used the term hearsay in accordance with that prior conception “to en-
compass any action or declaration involving a hearsay danger,” which “exists when a trier of fact
is asked to conclude that a proposition about a matter of fact is true because an extra-judicial
declarant stated it was the case or did an act, verbal or otherwise, from which it can be inferred
that he believed it to be true.”  Weinstein, supra note 6, at 331 (footnote omitted).  Though
ultimately he regarded adoption of a narrower definition as “probably sound,” he cautioned that
even for evidence falling outside such a definition, “the argument of hearsay danger should be
made to the trier in helping him evaluate evidence which requires reliance on the credibility of
an extra-judicial declarant.” Id. at 353–54.
27. Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence 22 (Mar. 7–9, 1968) [hereinafter
Mar. 1968 Meeting Minutes], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Minutes/EV03-1968-min.pdf.  Applying “regardless of whether the declarant is unavailable
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The Reporter was not happy about the change, and he questioned it
in a later memo.28  Rule 8-03, he explained, operated on the view that
if the declarant is available as a witness, then admissibility of the hear-
say is justifiable only if the quality of the hearsay evidence is “at least
as good as would be forthcoming if [the] declarant took the stand and
testified.”29  But Rule 8-04 stated a “less exacting” standard, because
if the declarant is unavailable, then “admittedly inferior hearsay evi-
dence may be used” because “the choice is between that and none.”30
When the Committee reconsidered the matter, it decided instead, af-
ter considerable debate, to bolster the latter Rule’s requirement of
“assurances of accuracy” by adding the modifier “strong.”31  Use of
that word was first suggested by Judge Weinstein.32
Even while submitting that daring first draft, the Reporter included
commentary raising serious reservations about according too much
discretion to the trial judge.33  The Committee’s Note to the Prelimi-
nary Draft of Article VIII34 also had a more restrictive feel than the
draft itself.  Citing Judge Weinstein’s article, the Note acknowledged
that “[a]bandonment of the system of class exceptions in favor of indi-
vidual treatment in the setting of the particular case, accompanied by
procedural safeguards, has been impressively advocated.”35  But then
the Committee said that it had “rejected this approach,” and indeed
as a witness,” the Reporter’s first draft of Rule 8-03 provided that the hearsay rule would not
render a statement inadmissible if “the nature of the statement and the special circumstances
under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the
declarant as a witness.”  Memorandum No. 19 from Edward W. Cleary, Reporter of the Advi-
sory Comm. on Evidence, Preliminary Note on Hearsay: The Components of Credibility, for the
Dec. 1967 meeting of the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence 113 [hereinafter Reporter’s
Memorandum No. 19] (on file with author), available at https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/
richardfriedman/Documents/19.%20Art%208%201st%20draft.pdf.  Applying only when “the
declarant is unavailable as a witness,” the draft of Rule 8-04(a) articulated a somewhat different
standard, taking the statement outside the hearsay exclusion if “the special circumstances under
which it was made offer assurances of reasonable accuracy.” Id. at 260.  Judge Weinstein moved
to delete the word “reasonable” from Rule 8-04(a), thus bringing the two rules closer together,
and the motion carried by a 5–4 vote, with two members abstaining and the others not present.
Mar. 1968 Meeting Minutes, supra, at 22.
28. Reporter’s Memorandum No. 19, supra note 27, at 40.
29. Id. at 40–41.
30. Id. at 41.
31. Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence 76–78 (May 23–25, 1968), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/EV05-1968-min.pdf.
32. Id. at 77.
33. Reporter’s Memorandum No. 19, supra note 27, at 15–19.
34. Comm. on the Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46
F.R.D. 161, 324 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
35. Id. at 327 (citing Weinstein, supra note 6).
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the reasons it cited amounted to a dismissal of three of the corner-
stones of Judge Weinstein’s approach.36
First, presumably because of that approach’s notice element, the
Committee believed that the approach would “enhanc[e] the difficul-
ties of preparation for trial, adding a further element to the already
over-complicated congeries of pretrial procedures.”37
Second, the Committee expressed disapproval of an approach “re-
quiring substantially different rules for civil and criminal cases.”38  Of
course, the Committee recognized that the confrontation right might
require exclusion of some statements when offered against a criminal
defendant even though they would be admissible in other contexts.39
For the most part, though not completely,40 it chose not to take ac-
count of that in crafting the hearsay rules, instead leaving it to the
ordinary judicial process to define the bounds of the confrontation
right.
Third, and most fundamentally, the Committee believed that Judge
Weinstein’s approach “involv[ed] too great a measure of judicial dis-
cretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings.”41  This concern
about discretion is perhaps surprising given the rule actually proposed
by the Committee, which it described as “a general rule excluding
hearsay, with two broadly phrased exceptions”—one “prescrib[ing]
the conditions under which hearsay is admissible without regard to
unavailability of the declarant” and the other doing the same for un-
available declarants.42  One might well wonder why the Committee
thought its draft rules would confine judicial discretion and yield pre-
dictability more than would the Weinstein approach.  The two excep-
tions created by the drafts of Rules 8-03 and 8-04 were extremely
open-textured, and the roles that the traditional exceptions played





39. See id. at 329–30.
40. Ultimately, the Committee did add one clause to the exception governing factual findings
resulting from authorized investigations, limiting it to “civil cases and against the government in
criminal cases,” Preliminary Draft, supra note 34 at 347, and the House, in an amendment
adopted on the floor, provided that the related exception for matters observed pursuant to duty
of law did not include “in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law en-
forcement personnel.”  120 CONG. REC. 2387–89 (1974).
41. Preliminary Draft, supra note 34, at 327.
42. Id. at 327–28.
43. The Advisory Committee noted: “The traditional hearsay exceptions are drawn upon to
illustrate the applicability of the two exceptions.” Id. at 328.  And Judge Weinstein wrote,
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Perhaps the Committee’s stance against excessive judicial discretion
with respect to hearsay was in part an attempt to fend off criticism
that it proposed to give courts too much discretion.  If so, the tactic
did not work; the criticism appears to have been so intense that the
Committee, in its March 1971 Revised Draft, substantially altered the
structure of the two rules (now designated by unhyphenated numbers
803 and 804).44  The Committee adopted an approach that it described
as being “that of the common law.”45  Now, instead of stating gener-
ally worded standards and providing a nonexclusive list of illustrations
drawn from the traditional exceptions, these rules each created a list
of exceptions.  The impact of the change was mitigated by including a
residual exception in each list, providing in broad simple terms that
the rule against hearsay would not require exclusion of “[a] statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”46  The
Committee explained that the enumerated exceptions were “designed
to take full advantage of the accumulated wisdom and experience of
the past in dealing with hearsay,” but that the two residual exceptions
were appropriate because “[i]t would . . . be presumptuous to assume
that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been
catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a
closed system.”47  And the Committee strove to set out a middle
course with respect to the matter of judicial discretion:
[The residual exceptions] do not contemplate an unfettered exercise
of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating new and pres-
ently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness
within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions.  Within this
framework, room is left for growth and development of the law of
evidence in the hearsay area . . . .48
The circumstantial proof of credibility which gave rise to the class exception may con-
tinue to be utilized in the particular case in assessing probative force. . . . [H]earsay
coming within one of the traditional exceptions may rightly be given greater weight by
a trier than testimony on the witness stand.
Weinstein, supra note 6, at 339.
44. Compare Preliminary Draft, supra note 34 at 345–86, with Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 419–45 (1971) [hereinafter Revised
Draft].
45. Revised Draft, supra note 44 at 411.
46. Id. at 422, 439.
47. Id. at 437.
48. Id.
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But Congress, it turned out, was unwilling to accept even this de-
gree of discretion with respect to hearsay.49  The House Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Justice, to which the Rules were referred, deleted the
residual exceptions “as injecting too much uncertainty into the law of
evidence.”50  If there was need for additional hearsay exceptions, the
Subcommittee said, they should be created “by amendments to these
Rules, not on a case-by-case basis.”51  The full House Committee on
the Judiciary,52 and then the House itself, accepted this decision.
The Senate moved partway back in the direction of the Advisory
Committee.  The Judiciary Committee expressed agreement with the
House “that an overly broad residual hearsay exception could emas-
culate the hearsay rule and the recognized exceptions or vitiate the
rationale behind codification of the rules.”53  But it also believed that
there were certain “exceptional circumstances” in which admission of
statements not fitting within the enumerated exceptions would be jus-
tified.54  Accordingly, it restored a form of the residual exceptions, but
with additional qualifications and the expressed intention that the
exceptions “be used very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances.”55
49. These two rules were not materially changed between the Revised Draft and the version
of the Rules that the Supreme Court promulgated in November 1972. Compare id. at 419–22,
438–39, with Supreme Court of the United States, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 300–03, 320–22 (1972).  Had Congress not intervened, that version
would have become effective on July 1, 1973. Id. at 184.  But Congress passed a statute provid-
ing that the Rules would not become effective unless affirmatively enacted into law.  Act of Mar.
30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
50. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 30 (1973), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES OF
EVIDENCE (SUPPLEMENT) 174 (Comm. Print 1973).
51. Id.
52. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 2, 5–6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7076,
7078–79.
53. S. REP.  NO. 93-1277, at 19–20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066.
54. Id.
55. Id.  The Committee changed the requirement of “comparable” guarantees of trustworthi-
ness to one of “equivalent” guarantees—perhaps a marginal tightening—and added require-
ments that the court determine that
(i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 3 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7106.
Of these, it appears that only (ii) could genuinely constrain discretion in any marked degree.
If a statement failed (i), it presumably would be inadmissible even without considering the hear-
say issue, and (iii) patently invites a wide-open exercise of discretion. See id.
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The full Senate stood by the Judiciary Committee, so the matter had
to be resolved in conference.  And the conference committee further
tightened up on the residual exceptions, adding a requirement of pre-
trial notice56 and thus adopting, in that particular context, a prong of
the Weinstein approach that the Advisory Committee had rejected at
the outset.  The conference version was enacted without further
change.57
Ultimately, then, the Rules took a cautious approach to hearsay:
Article VIII was more permissive than the common law, but only
mildly so: it gave trial judges some discretion to admit hearsay that did
not fit within the traditional exemptions, but in the hope that this dis-
cretion would be exercised rarely;58 it incorporated a notice require-
ment, but only in the residual exceptions; and it made virtually no
attempt to protect, or articulate, the confrontation right, or to take
account of different considerations applicable in civil and in criminal
cases.  Clearly, the drafters of the Rules were torn by desires on the
one hand not to make the hearsay rule overly rigid and restrictive, and
on the other by a sense that in some cases, admission of hearsay would
be a very bad result that trial judges acting without constraint might
reach.
III. THE CONFRONTATION PRINCIPLE
I believe that both concerns that led to the Rules’ ambivalent atti-
tude towards discretion were justified.  At least without the safety
valve of the residual exception,59 hearsay law is overly rigid and re-
strictive.  In some cases, it imposes considerable costs on litigants and
the judicial system, requiring the production of witnesses whose live
testimony has little marginal value.  The awkward and complex system
of enumerated exceptions cannot hope to mark out all the hearsay
that ought to be admitted.  And one reason for this, as indicated by
Judge Weinstein in Probative Force of Hearsay, in 1961, is that there is
no reason to suppose that triers of fact are so overwhelmed by hearsay
56. Id. at 3–4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7106.
57. Compare id., with Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, Rules 803, 804, 88 Stat. 1926, 1938–43 (1975).
58. But Judge Weinstein, for one, has not been reticent in exercising his discretion.  I recall a
conversation long ago—sometime in the 1980s, I am virtually certain—in which he told me, in
essence, that if he thinks hearsay is good evidence he lets it in.  I asked if he cited the residual
exceptions.  No, he said, he just lets it in, adding, “If they reverse me, they reverse me.”   He has
been consistent; I had a very similar conversation with him on the evening of April 23, 2014, the
night before the Symposium of which this Article is a part.
59. I will now refer to the exception in the singular, because Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) were
transferred to a new Rule 807 in 1997.
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that, as a general matter, it is better for the truth-determination pro-
cess that the hearsay be excluded than that it be admitted.60
On the other hand, the residual exception, among others, gave trial
courts sufficient leeway to achieve some very bad results.61  The draft-
ers may have hoped that such results might be prevented in criminal
cases by development of Confrontation Clause doctrine independent
of hearsay law, but that did not happen in the decades immediately
following the adoption of the Rules.  On the contrary, the Supreme
Court read the Confrontation Clause to be little more than a constitu-
tionalization of the traditional rule against hearsay.62  Adoption of the
Rules by most of the states may well have reinforced this tendency; by
creating something close to a national law of hearsay, it yielded a
readily discernable body of doctrine that might have appeared to ex-
press longstanding and universally accepted principles that underlay
the Confrontation Clause.
But a decade ago, in Crawford v. Washington,63 the Supreme Court
dramatically transformed the law governing the Confrontation Clause,
and the change opened up an opportunity to thoroughly revise the law
of hearsay. Crawford establishes confrontation doctrine that stands
independent of hearsay law: The Confrontation Clause, Crawford
makes clear, is a procedural protection governing how prosecution
witnesses give testimony, requiring that they do so not only under
oath but face-to-face with the accused, subject to cross-examination,
60. “There is little reason to believe that jurors—a much more highly educated and sophisti-
cated group than their English seventeenth and eighteenth century predecessors—are not . . .
capable of assessing hearsay’s force without giving it undue weight.”  Weinstein, supra note 6, at
353 (footnote omitted).  Empirical studies bear out this conclusion.  I explored the point in The
Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 433, 446 (2014).
61. Examples of cases in which the courts used the residual exceptions to secure admission of
statements that were clearly testimonial in nature include United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d
1112, 1118–20 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1036 (4th Cir. 1996); and
United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1134–36 (4th Cir. 1978).  In other cases, courts stretched
enumerated exceptions to cover the statements in question.  For example, in Hammon v. Indiana
(the companion case to Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)), the trial court used the excep-
tion for statements of present sense impressions to admit an affidavit making an accusation of
domestic violence, and treated an objection to it as trivial.  Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 976 (2005) (No. 05-5705), 2005 WL 3617526, at *19–20;
see also Friedman, supra note 60, at 442–43.  I represented Hammon in the Supreme Court.
62. Under Ohio v. Roberts, a statement characterized as hearsay presumptively violated the
Confrontation Clause, but the problem could be relieved if the declarant was unavailable and
the statement was deemed reliable, which could be established by showing that it fell within a
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception.  448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  Subsequently, though, the Court cut
back on the unavailability requirement, see United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986), and
the Court never applied it in a case in which the Federal Rules of Evidence would not have
required unavailability for admission of a hearsay statement.
63. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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and, if reasonably possible, at trial.64  If an out-of-court statement is
testimonial in nature and not given under the prescribed conditions,
then admitting it would, in effect, allow a witness to testify against the
accused in an improper manner.  The resulting Confrontation Clause
problem will not be relieved by demonstrating that ordinary hearsay
law does not pose an obstacle to admission,65 or that the statement
appears to be highly reliable.  But if a hearsay statement is not testi-
monial in nature, then the Confrontation Clause simply has no bear-
ing on admissibility.66
The basic principle reflected by Crawford—the idea that for testi-
mony to be acceptable, witnesses must testify face-to-face with the ad-
verse party—is very old; it long predates the hearsay rule, which did
not emerge in anything close to its modern form until around 1800,
and it has clear roots in some ancient legal systems.67  Now that Craw-
ford has focused our attention on this principle, a simple thought ex-
periment will be useful.  Think of a situation in which admission of
hearsay seems clearly unacceptable—not merely unwarranted on bal-
ance, but contrary to some basic conception of our adjudicative sys-
tem.  I believe it will almost certainly be a case in which admitting the
statement would, in effect, allow a witness to testify without con-
fronting the adverse party.  The statement by Lord Cobham while im-
prisoned in the Tower of London, accusing Walter Raleigh of treason,
is one such example; the statement by Sylvia Crawford, made in a
formal setting in a station house to police officers investigating a knife
fight that occurred earlier in the day, is another; the statement by
Amy Hammon, accusing her husband of assault, made to a police of-
ficer in her living room while another officer held the husband at bay,
is a third.
If a testimonial statement is offered against an accused, enunciation
of a clear and hard-edged doctrine68 is necessary to prevent cases of
64. Id. at 68.
65. This should have been apparent from Crawford. See id. at 60–61.  To the extent it was not,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts made it quite clear.  557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
66. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823–26; see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007).
67. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171,
1201–09 (2002).
68. The principle must be qualified, however, by recognition that the accused may forfeit the
right by at least some misconduct that renders the witness unavailable. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6);
see also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367–68 (2008).  I believe that the Supreme Court has
given an unfortunately narrow scope to this forfeiture doctrine. See Richard D. Friedman, Giles
v. California: A Personal Reflection, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 733 (2009).
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this sort, and for two reasons.69  First, it is in fact a clear and hard-
edged principle, a fundamental procedural matter, that makes admis-
sibility of these statements unacceptable.  We do not say that an ac-
cused has no right to counsel or to trial by a jury because he is
obviously guilty, or because in the particular case some other proce-
dure would be preferable.  Similarly, we should not say that an ac-
cused has no right to be confronted with an adverse witness because
the witness is clearly telling the truth, or because in the particular case
the determination of the truth would be advanced by allowing the wit-
ness to testify without confronting the accused.  Second, in an individ-
ual case, a court-given discretion will very often tend to give primacy
to the probative value of the statement in the particular case before it,
and less attention to underlying systemic principles.70
IV. NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY: THE NEED FOR
DISCRETION AND FLEXIBILITY
I have defended the need for a hard-edged exclusionary rule bar-
ring the admissibility, at least against an accused, of testimonial state-
ments when the opponent has not had an opportunity for
confrontation.  But if a hearsay statement is not testimonial in nature,
then I contend that there is no need for such a rule.  This is not to say
that the statement ought certainly be admitted, but only that it is best
to leave the matter to the discretion of the trial judge.
If the statement is not testimonial, then it appears that, so far as
hearsay considerations are concerned, no matter of principle is at
stake.  Nor is hearsay, by nature, likely to bias the trier of fact against
one party, the way that prior bad acts or criminal convictions are
likely to do.  The only real question is whether the benefits of admit-
ting the statement outweigh the costs.  Cost–benefit evidentiary deter-
minations of this sort are generally committed to the discretion of the
trial judge,71 and there is no reason why the same should not be true
when one of the factors weighing against admissibility is that the evi-
dence is hearsay.72
69. I will postpone, until near the end of this Article, discussion of whether a similar rule is
appropriate when a testimonial statement is offered against a party other than an accused. See
infra Part VI.
70. Crawford lists numerous cases of testimonial statements, the admission of which courts
had approved under the looser standard that prevailed beforehand.  541 U.S. at 63–65.
71. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
72. I discuss this matter further infra note 77.
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A. Unavailable Declarant
Consider first the case in which the declarant is unavailable and
could not have reasonably been made available for a deposition.
Thus, if the hearsay is inadmissible, the trier of fact will be denied any
evidence of the declarant’s observations.  The question as to admissi-
bility then becomes, rather simply, whether the hearsay is favorable
on balance to the truth-determination process.  We must assume, hy-
pothetically, that live testimony of the declarant would be more pro-
bative than prejudicial—for if it were not, then presumably neither
would be evidence of the declarant’s out-of-court statement, and such
evidence could be excluded on that basis without reaching the hearsay
question.  And, given that live testimony would be more probative
than prejudicial, there is no reason to suppose that the declarant’s out-
of-court statement asserting the same proposition would not be as
well.  As Judge Weinstein pointed out long ago, jurors are not so
weak-headed that they cannot take into account the deficits of hear-
say, especially when those deficits are pointed out by the trial judge.73
Empirical studies support the proposition that jurors do not give hear-
say excess weight—and certainly that they do not do so by so much
that closing their eyes and ears to the evidence is preferable to al-
lowing them to consider it for whatever it is worth.74  Usually, then,
hearsay considerations should not render inadmissible a nontestimo-
nial hearsay statement made by an unavailable declarant.  And given
this, it seems clear that there is no reason to have a presumptive rule
of exclusion that denies the trial judge discretion to admit the hearsay.
B. Available Declarant
If the declarant is available, the situation is more complex.  Perhaps
truth determination would be facilitated by bringing the declarant in
as a live witness.  But is it worth the cost and difficulty in a given case?
That, I believe, is a complex question that depends on the play of sev-
eral factors, which I will outline below—and it is sufficiently complex
that attempts to prescribe results for categories of statements are
bound to be less satisfactory than according broad discretion to the
trial judge.
I believe that a court has the best chance of reaching optimal deci-
sions on admissibility in this context—nontestimonial hearsay made
73. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 353.
74. See Friedman, supra note 60, at 446; see also Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman,
Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
MINN. L. REV. 655 (1992).
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by an available declarant—if it uses a simple procedural feature and
asks several basic questions.  The procedural feature is this:  If a pro-
ponent wishes to offer hearsay, but the opponent timely produces the
declarant willing and able to testify, then the court should give the
proponent the choice of putting the declarant on the stand as its own
witness or forgoing use of the hearsay.  The advantage of this proce-
dure is easy to see.  An opponent wishing to examine a hearsay de-
clarant will usually not produce the declarant as his own witness under
current practice; doing so entails several costs, the principal one being
that it will raise juror expectations and thus backfire if the opponent
does not gain some significant advantage from the examination.  And
for this reason, use of this procedure makes admission of the hearsay
much more appealing to the court:  Assuming the opponent is sub-
stantially as able as the proponent to produce the declarant, for exam-
ple, the court can tell the opponent, “Your adversary is satisfied to
introduce the hearsay, I believe it’s more probative than prejudicial,
and I’m not satisfied that making him produce the declarant is worth
the trouble and expense.  But if you want to produce her—if it’s really
important to you and you’re not just arguing that in an attempt to get
the hearsay excluded—be my guest.  If you do so on time, I’ll insist
that your adversary put the declarant on the stand and ask for her live
testimony, or forgo use of the prior statement.  So then you’ll presum-
ably be in the same position as if your adversary had produced her.”75
The court should ask questions such as the following:
First, how probable does it appear that the trier of fact’s ability to
determine the truth would be significantly enhanced by making the
declarant a live witness?  If it appears very probable that the state-
ment is true, or if it appears unlikely that the declarant would remem-
ber the event or condition described by the statement, there may be
75. I elaborated further on this in Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 883, 892–97 (1991).  In a subsequent article, I expressed reservations about
using this procedure universally, principally on the basis that “given that the proponent is satis-
fied to rest on the out-of-court statement of the declarant, it is not clear that the opponent ought
to have the opportunity to interrupt [the proponent’s case].”  Richard D. Friedman, Truth and
Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545, 559 (1998).  Continu-
ing the decades-long conversation I have been having with myself, I now would not put much
weight on that concern.  True, the proponent, by offering the hearsay, has shown that he would
prefer presenting the hearsay rather than presenting the witness live, subject to the interruption
of cross-examination.  But live testimony, subject to immediate cross-examination, remains the
preferred way of presenting a declarant’s statement.  Often, it is not worthwhile to insist that the
proponent present the witness live; if, however, the opponent has gone to the trouble of produc-
ing the declarant ready to testify, then it is not unduly burdensome to insist that the proponent
attempt to support his case with live testimony.  This is especially true given the large practical
advantages summarized in the text.
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limited value in bringing the declarant in as a live witness.  Given that
the statement is not testimonial, these conditions are particularly
likely to be true: The statement may well have been on a matter in
which the declarant had no interest and that would not have appeared
particularly salient to her.
Second, how difficult, and for whom, would it be to make the de-
clarant a live witness?  The declarant’s availability is a very complex
issue.  It is not a simple binary matter—available or unavailable.
Availability is a matter of degree, of how much trouble and expense
(financial or otherwise) it would take—or would have taken, if the
parties had taken prompt anticipatory action—to secure the live testi-
mony of the declarant at trial or, alternatively, at some other proceed-
ing such as a deposition.  Moreover, availability is not a one-
dimensional matter.  Rendering a declarant a witness in court or at
another formal proceeding depends on the performance of several
functions—identifying the declarant, locating her, securing her pres-
ence in court, and persuading her to testify—and it may be that one
party is substantially better able to perform one or more of these func-
tions than the other party.
Third, has the proponent given the opponent ample notice of intent
to offer the hearsay statement?  In this context, notice would enable
the opponent to produce the declarant as a live witness, if he so chose,
or otherwise secure evidence that would enable him to challenge the
significance of the hearsay evidence.
These questions generate a wide variety of possible combinations of
answers and of possible decisions by the court.  I will not attempt to
offer a comprehensive analysis here, but rather will present a few il-
lustrations.76  Suppose first that the court believes that live testimony
of the hearsay declarant is unlikely to enhance the quality of fact-find-
ing significantly, the proponent has no significant advantage over the
opponent in producing the declarant as a live witness, and the propo-
nent has given the opponent ample notice of intention to present the
hearsay.  This is a very strong case for admissibility of the hearsay.  By
hypothesis, the statement is not testimonial, it is more probative than
prejudicial, the proponent is satisfied to present the hearsay rather
than going to the cost and trouble of producing the declarant, and the
opponent is no less able to produce her than is the proponent.  If the
opponent nevertheless believes that it would be worthwhile to bring
the declarant in, he may do so—and if he does so in a timely manner,
76. Long ago, I explored this approach in some detail.  For that discussion, see Richard D.
Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV.
723 (1992).
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then, assuming the proponent still wants evidence from that declarant,
the proponent must put her on the stand as part of his case.  The pro-
ponent would first ask for the declarant’s current recollection of the
event or condition at issue, and the admissibility of the hearsay could
then be determined in light of that testimony.
At the other pole, suppose that the court believes that the accuracy
of the statement is questionable, it is on a subject that the declarant
should remember, and cross-examination will potentially be produc-
tive.  Suppose further that if the proponent had given the opponent
notice of his intention to use the hearsay, the opponent could have
produced the declarant in a timely manner as a live witness, but the
proponent has failed to give such notice and now production of the
declarant is not feasible.  This appears to be a good case for excluding
the hearsay—not because the jury is unable to address its deficiencies
but because exclusion will give this proponent, or others in a similar
position, incentive to generate better evidence, either by producing
the declarant as a live witness or by giving the opponent sufficient
notice to do so.
And then, of course, there is a myriad of cases in the middle.  The
court may have more or less confidence that there would be little or
no advantage to bringing the declarant in as a live witness.  The oppo-
nent may have gotten more or less notice of intention to use the hear-
say—the clarity as well as the time of notice may vary, because the
proponent might claim that even if he did not explicitly state his inten-
tion to present the hearsay, it was sufficiently obvious from the prior
course of proceedings.  And one party may have more or less of a
comparative advantage in performing any of the functions that are
necessary to secure the live testimony of a witness.  So, for example,
suppose that the proponent has given the opponent ample notice, the
court is uncertain as to whether it would be worthwhile to bring the
declarant in as a live witness, the declarant’s identity is known, the
proponent is better able than the opponent to locate her, and other-
wise, they are equally able to secure her live testimony.  One possible
ruling would be as follows: (1) The hearsay is admissible unless the
opponent indicates that if the proponent provides information as to
the declarant’s whereabouts, the opponent will secure her presence;
(2) if the opponent does so indicate, then the hearsay is inadmissible
unless the proponent gives the required information; and (3) if the
proponent does so, then the hearsay is admissible unless the opponent
does in fact secure the timely presence of the declarant, in which case
the proponent must put her on the stand as part of his case or forgo
use of the hearsay.
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The problem is kaleidoscopic in nature—variations in the basic in-
gredients of the problem can set up an extraordinary range of differ-
ent situations.  Any attempt to write a codification that prescribes
closely the resolution for each of these settings is not likely to yield
very good results.  I believe that we are better off committing the
problem, as we do most evidentiary problems, to the discretion of the
trial judge.  Judges can take into account all the particulars of the
given situation—including the procedural aspects—and craft a sensi-
ble response.
That does not mean that they will always exercise that discretion in
an optimal manner—any more than it means that they always exercise
optimally the extraordinary discretion that Federal Rule of Evidence
403 gives them.  But it does not appear to me that there is any good
reason to deprive them of discretion more in this realm than in any
other covered by Rule 403.  If the hearsay statement in question was
not made in anticipation of litigation, then admitting it does not
amount to allowing a witness to testify out of court.  No fundamental
principle is at stake, or at least not one subject to a bright-line rule.
The basic issue is, given all the circumstances of the particular case, to
what extent it is best—taking into account the goals of fairness, effi-
ciency, and accuracy in truth determination—to impose on the propo-
nent, rather than on the opponent, the burden of producing the
declarant as a live witness.   Trial judges accorded wide discretion will
not always answer that question sensibly, but they have a better
chance at doing so than do rulemakers who create general codifica-
tions that cannot adequately take into account the nuances of any par-
ticular case.77
77. The Reporter, Professor Cleary, did attempt in one of his memoranda to suggest reasons
why discretion might be more troublesome in the hearsay context than in others, but the argu-
ments do not strike me as strong.  He contended that “[w]hen it is proposed to confer upon the
trial judge a greater discretion to admit or exclude hearsay depending upon its probative force,
the effect is to move him into the area of credibility, one traditionally reserved to the trier of fact
and in any event not a basis heretofore for admitting or excluding evidence generally.”  Re-
porter’s Memorandum No. 19, supra note 27, at 17–18.  But taking probative value into account
in determining admissibility is precisely what Rule 403 prescribes.  Furthermore, the reliability of
a given type of hearsay is a traditional basis for exempting it from the hearsay rule; it is no
different, so far as the jury is concerned, if that determination is made by the judge in the indi-
vidual case rather than by rulemakers.  Finally, the argument seems particularly misplaced given
that the rule against hearsay is a presumptive rule of exclusion, and the question is whether the
court should have discretion to allow a given piece of hearsay to be presented to the jury.
One can also construct from Professor Cleary’s memorandum a more appealing argument as
to why discretion should be confined more in the hearsay context than in others: There is in fact
a dense body of hearsay law, because certain types of situations arise recurrently, and denying
lawyers and judges the guidance that is thus possible in the hearsay realm would entail substan-
tial opportunity costs. See id. at 18–19.  True enough, but I have two responses.  First, a discre-
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In short, I am suggesting that if the confrontation principle is pro-
tected by a hard-edged rule, the rest of hearsay law can and should be
made much more wide open.  As Judge Weinstein suggested long ago,
we can discard the long-standing system of class exceptions in favor of
a system that is procedurally sensitive and accords great discretion to
the trial judge.
Judge Weinstein has said that the experience that best prepared him
to be a trial judge was his time as a naval officer in World War II—
because it taught him to make decisions, which he had to do quickly
and intuitively.78  Life-and-death decisions in combat are of necessity
often entrusted to young officers.  Once we protect the genuine mat-
ters of principle that may be at stake, we should put no less trust in the
discretion of judges deciding the admissibility of hearsay.
V. CONDUCT IMPLICITLY REFLECTING A BELIEF
Note that if the approach suggested here is implemented, there is
no strong reason to limit it to evidence that falls within the Rules’
definition of hearsay, which extends only to statements that assert the
proposition in question.79  As Judge Weinstein emphasized, other con-
duct, not amounting to a declaration of the proposition but reflecting
the actor’s belief in it, may raise significant hearsay dangers.80  Such
other conduct is almost certainly not testimonial—conduct that con-
sciously creates evidence of a proposition, which is the essence of
what it takes to make conduct testimonial, almost by definition at-
tempts to communicate that proposition, by verbal or other means.
Usually, such other conduct does not raise problems of insincerity,
because if the actor was not trying to communicate the proposition at
issue, then she was not trying to do so insincerely.  These two factors
probably account for the fact that the Rules do not place such conduct
within the definition of hearsay.  But given that the conduct does not
tionary system allows the judge to consider openly a wider range of factors, but it does not
necessarily make results significantly less predictable.  On the one hand, in a discretionary re-
gime, judges may still use the traditional exceptions for guidance; on the other, under the tradi-
tional regime, judges often distort the exceptions.  Second, if predictability comes at the price of
too many bad results, it may not be worthwhile—and the discretionary residual exception has
been found necessary to minimize the bad results that the Rules’ codification would otherwise
yield.  (One data point: Michigan adopted a codification based on the Rules but without the
residual exceptions; eventually, though, it felt the need to add them in. See John Norman Scott,
Michigan Catches Up to the “Catch-Alls”: How Much Hearsay Will They Catch?, 14 T.M. COO-
LEY L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1997).  I am not aware of any jurisdiction that has deleted such an
exception.)
78. Conversation with Jack B. Weinstein (Apr. 24, 2014).
79. FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c).
80. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 353–54.
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assert the proposition at issue, it often raises a large ambiguity prob-
lem as to whether the conduct was motivated by belief in the proposi-
tion; when a statement asserts a given proposition, by contrast, it is
usually clear enough that the declarant intended to convey to her au-
dience that the proposition is true.
Let’s consider a concrete pair of illustrations drawn from the fa-
mous case of Wright v. Tatham.81  The question there was whether
Marsden, a wealthy decedent, had the mental capacity to make a
will.82  One piece of evidence was a letter written long before Mars-
den’s death by a neighbor.  The writer, who had no stake in the out-
come of the later-arising controversy, asked Marsden to get involved
in a local community dispute.83  Now, compare this to a hypothetical
statement made to a friend by the same neighbor, “Marsden is not
very bright, but he’s within the normal range of intelligence and un-
derstanding.” Which is better evidence of Marsden’s mental compe-
tence?  The answer to that question is not clear, but there is an
enormous ambiguity in using the letter for this purpose:  Did the au-
thor really write it because he believed Marsden was able to deal with
the matter, or was he merely being decorous and following acceptable
form, in full knowledge that Marsden’s steward would take care of the
matter, and indeed perhaps that Marsden himself would never even
see the letter?  To my mind, the unambiguous statement, made with
no apparent motive to lie and not in a testimonial capacity, is better
evidence on the point—and the potential value of cross-examination
is greater with respect to the letter writer than with respect to the
express declarant.  But at least it appears that we can draw no broad
conclusion that statements fitting within the Rules’ definition of hear-
say are less reliable proof of a proposition, or raise greater hearsay
dangers on the whole, than conduct that appears to reflect the actor’s
implicit belief in the proposition.  It certainly seems that, in a cost-free
world, we would want the actor to come to court and testify concern-
ing the proposition.
Here, then, is a great oddity of current law.  Assertions of a proposi-
tion offered to prove the truth of the proposition are presumptively
excluded by the rule against hearsay—but the rule has nothing at all
to say about conduct that, the proponent contends, implicitly reflects
the actor’s belief in the proposition.  A presumptive exclusion of the
latter type of evidence would be too restrictive.  But that does not
mean the dangers raised by evidence of this kind should be ignored, or
81. (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.); 5 Cl. & Fin. 670.
82. Id. at 559–60; 5 Cl. & Fin. at 672.
83. Id. at 560–62; 5 Cl. & Fin. at 673–79.
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should only be considered by the trier of fact in considering the weight
to attribute to the evidence.
The approach suggested here offers a way around the problem, be-
cause it can be applied generally to out-of-court conduct, communica-
tive or not, offered to prove a proposition on the basis that the
conduct shows that the actor believed the proposition to be true; that
is, its applicability does not depend on whether the conduct actually
asserted the proposition.  In either case, the problem from the court’s
perspective looks much the same.  In either case, assuming the con-
duct is not testimonial in nature and that it is more probative than
prejudicial, the evidence is presumptively useful for truth determina-
tion.  But live testimony of the actor might be preferable, and so the
court has to decide an allocation of the burdens for bringing the actor
to court.  In either case, the court should ask similar questions—to
what extent would the quality of the available evidence be improved
by bringing the actor in?  How difficult, and for whom, would it be to
perform each of the functions necessary to make the actor a live wit-
ness?  And to what extent has the opponent had notice of the propo-
nent’s intent to offer the evidence?
This means that there is no need for the court to police the concep-
tually difficult line between statements and other conduct.  Indeed,
there is no pressing need to worry about a definition of hearsay at all.
When the probative value of an offered item of evidence depends on
the perceptions of a person who is not scheduled to be a live witness,
the court does need to consider whether the quality of evidence avail-
able to the trier of fact would be significantly enhanced by securing
live testimony from that person, and if so, how to allocate the accom-
panying burdens.  But no doctrinal lines are necessary to guide the
court in performing that function.
VI. TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS NOT OFFERED
AGAINST AN ACCUSED
I have argued for a dichotomous approach—a hard-edged rule
preventing the admission of testimonial statements against an accused
if she has not had an opportunity for confrontation, and a wide-open,
nondoctrinal approach with respect to nontestimonial statements.
Now I will return to a question I postponed earlier—how should testi-
monial statements be dealt with when they are not offered against an
accused?
The Confrontation Clause, of course, applies only in favor of the
accused in a criminal case.  But the basic confrontation principle is
applicable, regardless of who offers the statement: For centuries, the
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common law has generally required a witness to testify face-to-face
with the party against whom her testimony is offered (or with repre-
sentatives of a nonindividual party), subject to cross-examination.84
Suppose, by contrast, the court routinely admits a statement that a
person made out of court, not subject to cross-examination, with the
intention that it would be used as evidence in litigation.  In that case,
we have created a system in which witnesses can testify without com-
ing to court.  Parties taking advantage of such a system might take the
testimony of witnesses in writing or by video.
But the question remains: Is that so bad?  In thinking about that
question, I will assume that, absent a hard-edged rule against admit-
ting the out-of-court testimony, the approach I have suggested above
for nontestimonial statements would still apply.  Thus, the court would
retain the discretion to exclude the evidence if, under all the circum-
stances, doing so would improve the truth-determination process.
And if the opponent produces the witness in a timely manner, then
the proponent must put the witness on the stand as part of the propo-
nent’s case or forgo use of the hearsay. To facilitate that procedure in
this context, I will assume further that the court will not, except in
unusual circumstances, admit testimonial statements made without an
opportunity for cross-examination unless the proponent has given the
opponent ample notice and otherwise put the opponent in as good a
position as the proponent to produce the witness.
Let’s assume first that after making the testimonial statement, but
before the opponent had an opportunity for cross-examination, the
witness became unavailable, through no fault of either party.85  The
choice is then between admitting testimony given under suboptimal
conditions or not allowing any testimony at all from that witness.
When such testimony is offered against an accused, it is the prosecutor
who must bear that risk rather than the accused, who has the constitu-
tional confrontation right.  But when another party offers the testi-
mony, no such absolute principle seems to apply.86  It is appropriate
84. There is some constitutional force to the requirement. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (“In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of
fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”).
85. I do not believe that the opportunity to take a deposition for discovery purposes should be
deemed an opportunity for cross-examination.  I presented arguments on this point in a petition
for certiorari seeking review of State v. Berkman, 976 N.E.2d 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).  Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, Berkman v. Indiana, 134 S. Ct. 155 (2013) (No. 12-10691) (memorandum
decision denying certiorari).
86. If, for example, a witness testifying at trial suddenly becomes ill or dies before the oppo-
nent has a chance for cross-examination, there is not clearly a per se rule, if the opponent is not a
criminal defendant, that the testimony must be struck.  1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 19, at
157–58 (Kenneth S. Broun gen. ed., 7th ed. 2013) (endorsing the principle that, while exclusion
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for the court to make a discretionary judgment as to whether an im-
paired loaf is better than no loaf at all.
Now assume that the witness is available equally to both parties, but
the proponent prefers to present the out-of-court statement.  The pro-
ponent might have this preference because bringing the witness in is
difficult or expensive, or because he anticipates that the witness will
be a poor one.  Given the assumed conditions, the opponent is in as
good a position as is the proponent to produce the witness in court,
and even if it is the opponent who does so and the witness takes the
stand, it will be as part of the proponent’s case.  Accordingly, the only
issue is one of burden:  To what extent should one party or the other
bear the burden of bringing the witness in or facing an adverse eviden-
tiary consequence (admissibility of the hearsay, in the case of the op-
ponent, or exclusion, in the case of the proponent)?  If the proponent
were a criminal prosecutor, the accused, having been notified of the
prosecutor’s intent to introduce a testimonial hearsay statement, could
be required to make a timely demand that the prosecutor bring the
witness in, but the burden of actually doing so could not be shifted to
the accused.87  In other contexts, though, I believe it is sometimes ap-
propriate to require the opponent to shoulder that burden.
Bear in mind some basic elements of the situation: (1) The propo-
nent is satisfied to present the out-of-court testimony, knowing that,
to a certain extent, it will be self-impeaching because the witness has
not appeared in court; (2) the testimony is more probative than preju-
dicial; and (3) the proponent is not substantially better able than the
opponent to produce the witness for live testimony.  Clearly, then, it
would be more efficient to allow the proponent to present the less
costly evidence with which he is satisfied, leaving it to the opponent to
secure live testimony and the opportunity for cross-examination if he
thinks it is worth the cost and the effort.  And it is not apparent that
there is any unfairness in such a ruling.  We treat civil litigants essen-
tially the same, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants, and discov-
ery gives them ample opportunity to learn the facts necessary to make
may be required in the case of a prosecution witness, the court should have discretion not to
strike testimony of other witnesses who are not able to complete participation in cross-
examination).
87. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts declares that “the Confrontation Clause imposes a bur-
den on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse
witnesses into court.”  557 U.S. 305, 324–25 (2009).  It also makes clear, though, that it is permis-
sible to create a simple “notice-and-demand” procedure. Id. at 326–27.  Under this procedure, if
the prosecution gives timely notice of its intent to offer a given type of document, the confronta-
tion right is deemed waived unless the accused makes a timely demand that the author of the
document testify as a live witness. Id. at 326–27.  If the accused does make the demand, the
prosecution must bring in the author or lose the benefit of the evidence.
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a reasoned judgment as to whether to bring the witness in.  As for a
prosecutor, she represents the power of the state and is generally in a
much more powerful position than is the accused in terms of ability to
gain information, to take risks, and to pay for what she believes will
help her position in litigation.  In large part because of these advan-
tages, her adversary is given a web of constitutional protections in liti-
gation, and it is the prosecutor who bears the burden of production
and a very demanding burden of persuasion on the elements of the
crime.  Accordingly, it does not seem unfair to say to a civil litigant or
to a prosecutor, “Your adversary is satisfied to have the witness testify
by a prerecorded video, knowing that the jury may discount the evi-
dence if the witness does not appear live.  The evidence is certainly
worth something, it’s better than nothing, and I’m not prepared to say
that the cost of bringing the witness in is clearly worthwhile.  You are
in as good a position as he is to bring the witness in, and if you do so,
I’ll make him put her on the stand as part of his case or give up on the
evidence—and assuming he does put her on, then you will have an
opportunity for cross-examination, just as if he had brought her in.  So
the choice is up to you whether it’s worth the time and effort.”
I have argued that if we protect the confrontation principle, we can
loosen up our system enormously with respect to other hearsay, to the
point that we do not even have to worry about a definition of hearsay.
And now I am suggesting that, though we must give full protection to
the confrontation right of criminal defendants, a lesser, though still
substantial, degree of protection might be appropriate when testimony
not given subject to cross-examination is offered against another
party.  No doubt, what I am suggesting would represent a dramatic
change in our trial procedure.  But I believe it is at least worth think-
ing about, because the efficiency gains would be substantial, and it is
not apparent that there would be any loss in fairness.
VII. CONCLUSION
I suggested at the outset that there were four cornerstones to Judge
Weinstein’s vision of hearsay, as presented in Probative Force of Hear-
say.  The approach I have presented here incorporates all of them.  It
would admit more hearsay than traditional law, and more even than
under the Federal Rules.  It would rely heavily on the discretion of the
trial court; indeed, except in the context of testimonial statements, it
would not place doctrinal limits on that discretion.  It would be highly
sensitive to procedural considerations, including but not limited to no-
tice.  And it would draw a sharp distinction between testimonial hear-
say offered by a prosecutor and other forms of hearsay.
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Such an approach, I believe, has obvious advantages over the tradi-
tional rubric of hearsay law.  It protects the confrontation rights of
criminal defendants, and in other settings, it allows for fair and effi-
cient presentation of evidence that will advance the search for truth.
So why, given the huge boost that Judge Weinstein provided, did
the drafters of the Rules, both on the Advisory Committee of which
he was a member and in Congress, not adopt such an approach nearly
half a century ago?  The principal reason, I believe, was that the draft-
ers had an intuitive sense, in the era before an independent concep-
tion of the confrontation right had been developed, that a wide-open
discretionary approach would lead to some truly intolerable results.
Most of those results, I believe, would allow a prosecution witness, in
effect, to provide testimony without confronting the accused.  But
now that the Crawford doctrine prevents those results, that should no
longer be a concern; indeed, even if the Supreme Court stepped back
from Crawford as a matter of constitutional law, the basic doctrine
should be incorporated into an ideal body of hearsay law.  The ability
of such a body of law to reach optimal results would be facilitated by
incorporating the procedural device discussed in this Essay:  A court
may impose on the opponent all or part of the burden of producing a
hearsay declarant as a live witness and yet insist that it be the propo-
nent who puts the witness on the stand.
These, then, are the missing pieces of the hearsay puzzle.  They
were not part of the discussion when the Rules were crafted.  But now
they are available.  We can make the law far more efficient without
sacrifice of any fundamental right, or of accuracy or fairness.  We
should not stand pat.
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